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Abstract
This paper explores the interaction between retirement flexibility and portfolio
choice in an overlapping-generations model of a closed economy. Retirement flexi-
bility is often seen as a hedge against capital market risks which justifies more risky
asset portfolios. We show, however, that this positive relationship between risk tak-
ing and retirement flexibility is weakened - and under some conditions even turned
around - if not only capital market risks but also productivity risks are considered.
Productivity risk in combination with a high elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure creates a positive correlation between asset returns and labour
income, reducing the willingness of consumers to bear risk. Moreover, it turns out
that general equilibrium effects can either increase or decrease the equity exposure,
depending on the degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure.
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1 Introduction
In the developed world, population ageing and the current credit crisis are putting the
traditional social security systems under financial pressure. Consequently, in many coun-
tries policy makers are considering to reform their social security system. In particular,
various countries are gradually reducing their pay-as-you-go (PAYG) schemes in favour
of more funded-based systems. In other countries, like the United States, Australia, the
United Kingdom and Switzerland, we observe a move from collective funded schemes with
defined benefits to individual funded schemes with defined contributions. In effect, all
these reforms point to a shift in the responsibility for pension provision from collective in-
stitutions to individuals. Accordingly, in the coming decades we may expect that human
capital formation and retirement flexibility (often referred to as the fourth pension pillar)
will become increasingly important in accommodating the needs during retirement.
This commonplace trend from collective pension institutions with a predominantly
inflexible retirement age towards individual arrangements with a more flexible retirement
age, will certainly have implications for economic decisions of individuals. In this paper,
we raise the question how retirement flexibility will affect consumption and portfolio de-
cisions during working life. To answer this question, we distinguish between a partial
equilibrium setting and a general equilibrium setting. In the first setting, we can study
the effect of retirement flexibility on the portfolio share invested in equity while in the
second one we are able to analyse the effect on the risk premium on stocks. Our analysis
aims to get a better understanding of the implications of increasing retirement flexibility
for important economic decisions, like the saving decision, portfolio allocation and the
retirement decision. The results can particularly be relevant for private or public insti-
tutions to which individuals have dedicated their saving and investment decisions, like
pension funds, trust funds or life insurance companies.
There are already many studies that focus on the interaction between portfolio, con-
sumption and retirement decisions. Starting point is the work of Bodie et al. (1992) which
analyses this interaction assuming that labour can be adjusted continuously. Subsequent
studies, like e.g. Choi and Shim (2006), Choi et al. (2008) and Farhi and Panageas (2007),
model optimal retirement as a discretionary stopping problem. Although all these studies
differ in many respects, they have in common that they focus on partial equilibrium mod-
els and mainly stick to capital market risks. In addition, they all find that more flexibility
in the retirement decision increases the portfolio share invested in stocks. Viewed in this
way, retirement flexibility serves as a hedge against adverse investment outcomes. The
basic mechanism behind this insurance effect is the negative correlation between asset
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returns and labour income enabling agents to take more risk. Indeed, a negative wealth
shock causes the marginal utility from leisure to decrease and hence agents increase labour
supply which, in turn, raises labour income.
Compared to the existing literature in general and the work of Bodie et al. (1992)
in particular, we add three important elements to the analysis on portfolio choice and
retirement. First, in our model we distinguish between productivity and depreciation risk
and both risk factors are directly linked to the production structure of the economy. This
distinction is important because both risk factors constitute a rather different effect on
income and substitution effects in labour supply. As will be shown, the relative strength
of income and substitution effects determines whether retirement flexibility indeed serves
as a hedge against bad investment outcomes. Second, we use a general equilibrium
approach rather than a partial equilibrium approach. We therefore explicitly recognize
that consumption and labour supply decisions affect factor prices which, in turn, influence
the insurance effect of retirement flexibility. To illustrate, if every old worker decides to
work longer after an adverse shock, wages will decline in general equilibrium making the
insurance effect of retirement flexibility less effective. Optimizing agents will respond to
this by lowering their risk exposure. Third, following Choi et al. (2008), we allow for more
general preferences which are characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function of consumption and leisure. The general CES specification allows the elasticity
of substitution between labour and leisure to take any positive number, and therefore
becomes an essential feature when retirement flexibility is introduced in the model.
To analyse the interaction between lifetime portfolio choice, consumption and re-
tirement decisions, we develop a two-period overlapping-generations (OLG) model of a
closed economy in the spirit of Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The model in-
cludes government debt and incorporates endogenous retirement. In our framework, the
young working generation decides upon his consumption and the allocation of his asset
portfolio. Agents can either invest in risk-free government bonds or in risky firm stocks.
Our model is related to the model of Adema (2008) which is also a stochastic two-period
OLG model of a closed economy with government debt. There, however, the return on
bonds is subject to inflation risk while retirement is exogenous. In our model, retirement
is endogenous and we compare two different retirement settings: under flexible retire-
ment, the old generation can freely postpone or advance retirement in the second period
after a realization of shocks; under fixed retirement, this generation has to make this de-
cision already before shocks are revealed. Once set, this decision cannot be subsequently
changed when new information becomes available.
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We use log-linearization techniques to characterize the main insights of the model.
This method is widely applied in the real business cycle literature (see e.g. Campbell,
1994; King et al., 2002 or Uhlig, 1999), but it is also often used in stochastic overlapping
generations models (see Bohn, 2009 or Jensen and Jørgensen, 2008). The standard pro-
cedure used in these studies is to first derive the non-stochastic steady state and then to
take first-order Taylor approximations around this steady state. The resulting system of
log-linear difference equations can then be solved either numerically or analytically. To
study macroeconomic dynamics, as most of the aforementioned studies do, this procedure
is sufficient. It is less suitable, however, for an analysis involving asset-pricing issues, as
we do here. We therefore log-linearize the model around a stochastic steady state which
explicitly takes the second-order risk terms into account. This method has already been
used by Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009) and Bovenberg and Uhlig (2008), who both study
risk-sharing issues in relation to social security, but until now it has never been applied
to portfolio allocation in relation to endogenous retirement.
Our analysis provides some interesting insights. First, the positive relation between
retirement flexibility and a higher risk appetite is weakened - and under some conditions
even turned around - if not only depreciation shocks but also productivity shocks are con-
sidered. Depreciation shocks mainly affect the return on capital and through the income
effect these shocks contribute to the traditional view that retirement flexibility increase
risk-taking behaviour. Productivity shocks, in contrast, do not only directly affect capital
returns but also influence wages. Consequently, productivity shocks also induce substi-
tution effects in labour supply which work in the opposite direction. These substitution
effects generate a positive correlation between asset returns and labour income, thereby
reducing the risk-bearing capacity of consumers.
Second, confining the analysis to Cobb-Douglas utility, as most of the existing studies
do, ignores the essential role of the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure in studying retirement flexibility. This elasticity of substitution governs the rela-
tive strength of income and substitution effects in labour supply and, hence, determines
the insurance effect of flexible retirement. Our analysis clearly shows that flexible retire-
ment amplifies consumption volatility if substitution effects are important, a notion also
put forward by Basak (1999). Of course, whether substitution effects are important or not
is largely an empirical question. Empirical studies have shown that implicit taxes have
a large negative effect on the labour supply of elderly indicating that substitution effects
are indeed important in retirement behaviour (Asch et al., 2005; Coile and Gruber, 2001
and Gruber and Wise, 2004). Moreover, many empirical studies exploring the impact
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of a change in pension wealth on the retirement decision find modest effects (Bloemen,
2010; French, 2005, and Krueger and Pischke, 1992).
Finally, we find that general equilibrium effects play an important role in the interac-
tion between portfolio choice and retirement. Ignoring these effects by sticking to a partial
equilibrium framework can either overstate or understate the hedging effect of retirement
flexibility, dependent on the degree of substitutability between consumption and leisure.
If the elasticity of substitution is high, agents choose to supply less labour after a negative
productivity shock. In general equilibrium, this labour supply response exacerbates the
direct fall in the return on capital due to the productivity contraction. Compared to par-
tial equilibrium, this higher sensitivity of the capital return for productivity risk results
in lower portfolio shares invested in equity. Of course, for low elasticities of substitution
just the opposite holds: then the insurance effect is more effective in general equilibrium
than in partial equilibrium, leading to higher equity shares in asset portfolios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basics of the
stochastic OLG model. In Section 3, we explain how to solve this model using a log-
linearization technique around the stochastic steady state. Section 4 presents some an-
alytical results for a simplified version of the model that reproduces the main findings
of the current literature. In Section 5 we present and compare numerical results for
the partial equilibrium model and for the general equilibrium model. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The model
In this section, we develop a two-period OLG model of a closed economy. In order to
analyse the interaction between retirement and portfolio choice, we include government
debt in the model as an alternative investment vehicle for future consumption and in-
troduce endogenous retirement in the second period of life. The economy is subject to
productivity risk and depreciation risk.
At each point in time, the young individual determines his rate of consumption of a
single good and the proportion of financial wealth to invest in the risky asset. The old
generation has to decide which fraction of the second period it will spend on working
and on enjoying retirement. Following Bodie et al. (1992), we consider two different re-
tirement settings: (i) under flexible retirement, the old generation can freely postpone
or advance retirement in the second period after a realization of shocks; (ii) under fixed
retirement, the retirement decision has to be made before shocks are revealed. Once set,
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the retirement age cannot be subsequently changed after new information has become
available. Whatever the retirement setting (flexible or fixed), an individual sets his de-
cision variables optimally, conditional on his information to date: his current financial
wealth, the future dynamics of the asset returns and his uncertain future wage.
2.1 Production
The young and old generation are composed of the same large number of individuals
and this number is normalized to unity. Production per young worker is described by a
standard neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
f(kt, zt) = Atk
α
t (1 + zt)
1−α (1)
with At the stochastic total productivity parameter, α the capital share in production
and kt the capital stock per young worker. Total labour supply, 1 + zt, consists of
young workers inelastically supplying one unit of labour and old workers, each spending
a fraction 0 ≤ zt ≤ 1 of time on working. Profit maximisation and perfect competition
among producers results in the standard equilibrium conditions:
wt = (1− α)Atkαt (1 + zt)−α (2)
rk,t + δt = αAtk
α−1
t (1 + zt)
1−α (3)
where wt is the real wage, rk,t the return on capital and δt can be interpreted as the
stochastic depreciation rate of capital. Note that productivity risk directly affects the
capital return and the wage rate, while depreciation risk only directly affects the return on
capital. Of course, there is an indirect link between the wage rate and depreciation risk,
to the extent that labour supply behaviour affects factor prices in general equilibrium.
The stochastic processes for total factor productivity and capital depreciation are:
logAt = logA+ ωA,t (4)
log δt = log δ + ωδ,t (5)
with ωA,t and ωδ,t independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2A and σ
2
δ .
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2.2 Consumers
Individuals derive utility from consumption and leisure. Expected lifetime utility of a
representative individual born at t is given by the following constant-relative-risk-aversion
(CRRA) utility function:
Ut =
c1−θ1,t − 1
1− θ + β
Et v(c2,t+1, 1− zt+1)1−θ − 1
1− θ (6)
where c1,t is consumption when young at time t, c2,t+1 is consumption when old at t+ 1,
β is the time discount factor and θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion which is
identical to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The per-period
utility function v(·) has a CES specification and is defined as:1
v(c2, 1− z) =
[
(1− γ)c1−ρ2 + γ (1− z)1−ρ
] 1
(1−ρ)(1−γ) (7)
where γ defines the relative preference for leisure and ρ represents the inverse of the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in the second period. This
specification includes the familiar Cobb-Douglas period utility function v(c2, 1 − z) =
c2(1− z)γ/(1−γ) if ρ = 1.
People can either invest in firm stocks which yield the stochastic return rk,t+1 or in
government bonds with the risk-free return rb,t+1. The share of savings that is invested
in equities is denoted by λt, so that the return on the asset portfolio can be defined as:
rt+1 ≡ (1− λt)rb,t+1 + λtrk,t+1 (8)
Consumption in the first and second period of life are respectively given by:
c1,t + st = wt − τt (9)
c2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1) st + zt+1wt+1 (10)
where τt are lump-sum taxes to finance the interest obligations on the government debt.
Maximising lifetime utility with respect to consumption (c1,t and c2,t+1) and the portfolio
allocation (λt) subject to the budget constraints gives the following Euler condition:
c−θ1,t = β Et
[
(1 + rj,t+1) c
−ρ
2,t+1v(c2,t+1, zt+1)
ρ−φ] (11)
1Defining the per-period function in this way implies that the coefficient of relative risk aversion with
respect to consumption is equal to θ if ρ = 1.
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for j = b, k and with φ ≡ θ − γ(1− ρ).
The first-order condition with respect to labour supply (zt+1) differs between flexible
and inflexible retirement.2 In the first case, the optimality condition is:(
c2,t+1
1− zt+1
)ρ
=
wt+1
η
(12)
with η ≡ γ/(1 − γ). In the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption is equal to the wage rate. Since agents can freely adjust labour supply
in period t+ 1, this decision is conditional on the shocks that affect consumption and the
wage rate in that period, i.e., ωA,t+1 and ωδ,t+1. With inflexible retirement, though, the
first-order condition is:
Et
[
η (1− zt+1)−ρ v(c2,t+1, zt+1)ρ−φ
]
= Et
[
wt+1c
−ρ
2,t+1v(c2,t+1, zt+1)
ρ−φ] (13)
Since agents are not able to condition the retirement decision at the state of the economy
in t+1, they have to form expectations. Hence, in this case zt is a predetermined variable.
2.3 Government
The government debt per young worker, bt+1, is equal to the amount of debt in the
previous period plus the interest obligations on the outstanding debt minus the collected
tax receipts. That is,
bt+1 = (1 + rb,t) bt − τt (14)
The government can accumulate debt for a certain amount of time, but at some point
in time it has to raise additional taxes in order to keep debt per young worker constant,
i.e., bt+1 = bt = b. These lump-sum taxes are denoted by τ and are equal to:
τt = rb,tb (15)
Like the capital stock and labour supply (in case of fixed retirement), the bond return
rb,t is a predetermined variable: it denotes the interest that is paid at time t on the
government debt that is issued one period before, in t− 1.
2Throughout the analysis, zt+1 indicates labour supply in the second period of life. Under fixed
retirement, however, zt+1 is chosen in the first period and therefore known at time t.
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2.4 Equilibrium
The capital market (and the goods market as well) is in equilibrium when savings at time
t finance the capital stock and the government debt in the next period:
st = kt+1 + bt+1 (16)
Moreover, the portfolio allocation has to be such that the right amount of private savings
goes to the capital stock and the government debt:
λtst = kt+1 (17)
This implies that there are two equilibrium conditions and kt+1 and rb,t+1 adjust to make
sure that these equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
The complete model is summarized in Table 1. To construct equation (T1.1) we
have substituted equations (15) and (16) in equation (9). Equation (T1.2) is the result of
inserting the portfolio rate of return (8) and the equilibrium conditions (16) and (17) into
equation (10). The remaining equations, equation (T1.4)-(T1.7b), just repeat equation
(11) (for j = k and j = b) and equations (2), (3), (12) and (13).
3 Solving the model
There are various ways to solve this model. One way is to solve the model numeri-
cally using dynamic programming methods or using perturbation methods around the
deterministic steady state (see, for instance, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004). Another
possibility is to approximate the model using log-linearization around the steady state.
The latter gives a bit more insight into the working of the model, and it is the road we
will take in this paper. It should be understood that log-linearization is a small-shock
approximation or an approximation to shocks with bounded support (Samuelson, 1970).
Despite these limitations of log-linear approximations, this method clearly helps to ex-
plore the most important economic factors that affect the interaction between retirement
behaviour and portfolio choice. As such, it provides a useful starting point for further
qualitative explorations with higher-order numerical techniques.
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Table 1: Summary of model equations
wt − c1,t − rb,tb = b+ kt+1 (T1.1)
c2,t = (1 + rb,t) b+ (1 + rk,t) kt + ztwt (T1.2)
c−θ1,t = β Et
[
(1 + rk,t+1) c
−ρ
2,t+1v(c2,t+1, zt+1)
ρ−φ] (T1.3)
c−θ1,t = β (1 + rb,t+1) Et
[
c−ρ2,t+1v(c2,t+1, zt+1)
ρ−φ] (T1.4)
wt = (1− α)Atkαt (1 + zt)−α (T1.5)
rk,t + δt = αAtk
α−1
t (1 + zt)
1−α (T1.6)
(
c2,t+1
1− zt+1
)ρ
=
wt+1
η
(T1.7a)
Et
[
wt+1c
−ρ
2,t+1v(c2,t+1, zt+1)
ρ−φ] = Et [η (1− zt+1)−ρ v(c2,t+1, zt+1)ρ−φ] (T1.7b)
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3.1 The steady state
A linearization around a deterministic steady state is sufficient for understanding macroe-
conomic dynamics, but it is not necessarily sufficient for an economic analysis involving
uncertainty, such as questions about precautionary savings and asset-pricing issues. Fol-
lowing Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009) and Bovenberg and Uhlig (2008), we therefore use
the concept of a stochastic steady state. This concept is defined as a situation in which
each period shocks are equal to their expectations but agents are not aware of this (i.e.,
conditional variances are not zero). This point is solved from a nonlinear system, and
hence the solution does not generally correspond to the expected values of the variables
involved.3
The complete system of steady-state equations is described in Table 2. Variables
without time index refer to steady-state values. Notice that equations (T2.1), (T2.2),
(T2.5), (T2.6) and (T2.7a) have exactly the same form as the original model equations
of Table 1. The remaining expectational equations, i.e., equations (T2.3), (T2.4) and
(T2.7b), are derived using second-order Taylor approximations of the original first-order
conditions.4 The use of a stochastic steady state implies that risk terms σ2rk−v, σ
2
v , σ
2
w−c2
and σ2c2 show up in the first-order conditions reflecting a precautionary motive for saving
and postponing retirement. These conditional (co)variances are defined as:
σ2rk−v ≡ Vart [log (1 + rk,t+1)− φ log c2,t+1 + η(ρ− φ) log(1− zt+1)] (18)
σ2v ≡ Vart [−φ log c2,t+1 + η(ρ− φ) log(1− zt+1)] (19)
σ2w−c2 ≡ Vart (logwt+1 − φ log c2,t+1) (20)
σ2c2 ≡ Vart [(ρ− φ) log c2,t+1] (21)
At this point, we implicitly assume that these variances are constant over time. This will
be justified in the next subsection, when solving for the linear recursive law of motion for
the log-linearized system.
In general, the system in Table 2 can not be solved analytically. Only for a particular
situation we are able to obtain explicit solutions, namely if: i) lifetime utility is log-linear
in consumption and leisure (θ = ρ = 1); ii) there is full depreciation (δ = 1) and iii)
all conditional covariances are perceived to be zero (deterministic steady state). In that
case, we obtain the following analytical expressions for retirement z and the capital-labour
3Since the solution is not necessarily equal to expected values of the variables, Beetsma and Bovenberg
(2009) label this solution as the median solution. We prefer to use the term stochastic steady state to
indicate that the steady state is adjusted for risk.
4See Appendix A.1 for more details. See also Viceira (2001).
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Table 2: The steady-state equations
w − c1 − rbb = b+ k (T2.1)
c2 = (1 + rb) b+ (1 + rk) k + zw (T2.2)
c−θ1 = β (1 + rk) c
−φ
2 (1− z)η(ρ−φ) exp
(
1
2
σ2rk−v
)
(T2.3)
c−θ1 = β (1 + rb) c
−φ
2 (1− z)η(ρ−φ) exp
(
1
2
σ2v
)
(T2.4)
w = (1− α)Akα(1− z)−α (T2.5)
rk + δ = αAk
α−1(1 + z)1−α (T2.6)
(
c2
1− z
)ρ
=
w
η
(T2.7a)
(
c2
1− z
)ρ
=
w
η
exp
[
1
2
(
σ2w−c2 − σ2c2
)]
(T2.7b)
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ratio k/(1 + z):5
z(λ) =
λ(1− α)− αη
λ(1 + η − α) + (1− λ)αη (22)
k
1 + z
(λ) =
[
αβA(1 + η + α)λ− 2α2βA
(1− α)λ+ αβ(2 + η)λ+ 2α
] 1
1−α
(23)
Notice from these expressions that both labour supply and the capital-labour ratio posi-
tively depend on the portfolio share λ invested in firm stocks: if λ decreases, for example
because of a higher government debt, this leads to a crowding out of firm stocks which
reduces the capital-labour ratio. In general equilibrium, a lower capital-labour ratio re-
duces the wage rate and, hence, labour supply incentives. Simulations confirm that this
property of the model also holds under more general assumptions for which analytical re-
sults are not available. Given a solution to equations (22) and (23), all other steady-state
variables can be calculated.
3.2 The log-linearized model
In the usual situation of a non-stochastic steady state, this steady state can be computed
separately from the recursive laws of motion. With a stochastic steady state, though,
this procedure does no longer apply. In this case, deriving the recursive laws involves
the calculation of a fixed point: note from equations (T2.3), (T2.4) and (T2.7b) that the
steady state requires knowledge of the conditional variances, which can be calculated,
given the log-linear recursive law of motion. But the latter is a solution to a system
of equations of which the coefficients depend on the steady state. Hence, we are forced
to simultaneously solve for the steady state and the log-linear recursive laws of motion.
Throughout the paper, we use the following notation for log-linearized variables: xˆt ≡
log xt − log x. The complete log-linearized model is reported in Table 3.
Solving for the steady state and the log-linearized equilibrium laws involves a three-
step procedure. The first step is to write the log-linearized endogenous variables as func-
tion of the endogenous and exogenous state variables. Our model contains two exogenous
state variables, productivity shocks (ωA,t) and depreciation shocks (ωδ) and one endoge-
nous state variable, which is the capital stock (kˆt). Recall that the return on government
bonds (rˆb,t) and labour supply in case of retirement inflexibility (zˆt) are predetermined
variables at time t. It turns out, however, that both variables are proportional to the
5See Appendix A.2 for the formal derivation.
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Table 3: The log-linearized model
wwˆt − c1cˆ1,t = kkˆt+1 + rbbrˆb,t (T3.1)
c2cˆ2,t = rkkrˆk,t + (1 + rk) kkˆt + rbbrˆb,t + zw (zˆt + wˆt) (T3.2)
φEt cˆ2,t+1 − θcˆ1,t = rk
1 + rk
Et rˆk,t+1 − η(ρ− φ) z
1− z Et zˆt+1 (T3.3)
φEt cˆ2,t+1 − θcˆ1,t = rb
1 + rb
rˆb,t+1 − η(ρ− φ) z
1− z Et zˆt+1 (T3.4)
wˆt = αkˆt − α z
1 + z
zˆt + ωA,t (T3.5)
rˆk,t +
δ
rk
δˆt =
rk + δ
rk
[
(1− α) z
1 + z
zˆt − (1− α)kˆt + ωA,t
]
(T3.6)
zˆt+1 =
1− z
ρz
wˆt+1 − 1− z
z
cˆ2,t+1 (T3.7a)
zˆt+1 =
1− z
ρz
Et wˆt+1 − 1− z
z
Et cˆ2,t+1 (T3.7b)
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capital stock so that they can be eliminated from the state space.6
The proportional (and negative) relation between the return on bonds and the capital
stock follows from capital market equilibrium: a higher capital stock combined with
a constant level of government debt has to result in a more aggressive asset portfolio.
To make this happen, the risk-free return on bonds will fall. The proportional relation
between labour supply and the capital stock in case of retirement inflexibility can either be
positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of income and substitution effects:
a higher next-period capital stock leads to higher future wage expectations. Hence,
rational agents, who plan to retire before shocks are revealed under retirement inflexibility,
will postpone retirement if the substitution effect dominates and will advance retirement
if the income effect dominates.
Accordingly, the capital stock is the only endogenous state variable in the model. For
any endogenous variable xˆt we are looking for the following recursive equilibrium law:
xˆt = pix,kkˆt + pix,AωA,t + pix,δωδ,t (24)
where pix,k is the partial elasticity of xˆt with respect to kˆt, pix,A is the partial elasticity of
xˆt with respect to ωA,t and pix,δ is the partial elasticity of xˆt with respect to ωδ,t.
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As a second step, we use the derived recursive law to write the conditional variances
in terms of the steady-state values and the exogenous shock terms. Then we obtain for
the variance terms of the Euler equations:
σ2rk−v ≡
∑
i=A,δ
[
rk
1 + rk
pirk,i − φpic2,i −
η(ρ− φ)z
1− z piz,i
]2
σ2i (25)
σ2v ≡
∑
i=A,δ
[
−φpic2,i −
η(ρ− φ)z
1− z piz,i
]2
σ2i (26)
σ2w−c2 ≡
∑
i=A,δ
(piw,i − φpic2,i)2 σ2i (27)
σ2c2 ≡
∑
i=A,δ
[(ρ− φ)pic2,i]2 σ2i (28)
Note that these variances are indeed constant over time, as assumed in the previous
subsection. Equations (25) and (26) apply to the flexible retirement setting as well
as to the inflexible retirement setting, but the partial elasticities differ in both cases.
6See Appendix B, equations (A.19) and (A.21), for a formal proof of this statement.
7The partial elasticities of the endogenous variables are derived in Appendix B.1 (flexible retirement)
and Appendix B.2 (fixed retirement).
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Equations (27) and (28) only apply to the inflexible retirement setting.
In the final step, we numerically solve for the steady-state variables, given the derived
expressions for the conditional variances. In case of retirement flexibility, this boils down
to solving equations (T2.1)-(T2.7a), equation (25) and equation (26). For retirement
inflexibility, the complete system of equations is described by equations (T2.1)-(T2.6),
(T2.7b) and (25)-(28). Once solved for the steady state, the computed formulas in Ap-
pendix B.1 (for flexible retirement) and Appendix B.2 (for flexible retirement) retrieve
the partial derivatives, and hence, the linear recursive system.
4 Portfolio choice in partial equilibrium
As mentioned in the Introduction, the current literature on retirement flexibility and
portfolio choice only focuses on partial equilibrium models and mainly sticks to capital
market risks. The main result that can be derived from this literature is that flexibility
in the retirement decision increases the fraction of wealth invested in equity.8 Viewed in
this way, labour supply flexibility creates a kind of insurance against adverse investment
outcomes. In this section, we illustrate this benchmark result in the context of our model.
With reference to the literature, we take a partial equilibrium perspective (factor prices
are exogenous) and assume that there is only capital market risk implying that wages
are non-stochastic. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we impose that expected
lifetime utility is log-linear in first-period consumption, second-period consumption and
leisure (i.e., ρ = θ = 1).
To derive an explicit solution for the portfolio choice λt, we follow the approach of
Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Campbell and Viceira (2002) and assume that the joint
distribution of consumption and asset returns is lognormal. Then the optimal solution
for portfolio choice in case of flexible retirement is given by (see Appendix C.1):
λFt =
[
1 +
wt+1
(1 + rb,t+1) st
]
log Et (1 + rk,t+1)− log (1 + rb,t+1)
Vart log (1 + rk,t+1)
(29)
The optimal investment share in the risky asset is increasing in the expected excess
return of the risky asset and decreasing in its variance. In case of inflexible retirement,
the optimal equity share equals (see Appendix C.2):
λIt =
[
1 +
wt+1zt+1
(1 + rb,t+1) st
]
log Et (1 + rk,t+1)− log (1 + rb,t+1)
Vart log (1 + rk,t+1)
(30)
8See, e.g., Bodie et al. (1992), Choi et al. (2008), Choi and Shim (2006) or Farhi and Panageas (2007).
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Note that equation (29) and equation (30) are identical except for one factor: λF contains
maximum potential human capital while λI contains actual labour income which is scaled
by zt+1 < 1.
9 Hence, it is straightforward to derive the following result:
Result 1. The investment allocation to the risky asset is larger in the case of flexible
retirement compared to the inflexible retirement case, i.e., λFt > λ
I
t .
Result 1 is well-known from the literature, and was first derived by Bodie et al.
(1992).10 If agents have the possibility to postpone retirement after an adverse shock,
they can afford to take more investment risk during working life. As shown by equations
(29) and (30), this higher risk taking stems from a wealth effect. The demand for the
risky asset depends positively on the amount of human wealth of an individual. With
flexible retirement, the individual has in effect a larger store of human capital upon which
to draw. Since human capital is risk free (at least until now), the individual rebalances
his total wealth holdings by investing a larger share of financial wealth in the risky asset.
By contrast, with fixed retirement an individual has a smaller amount of potential human
capital from which to invest and therefore requires less rebalancing.
Obviously, these differences in portfolio allocation have consequences for the retire-
ment decision. With flexible labour supply, the optimal solution for retirement is equal
to (see again Appendix C.1):
zFt+1 = 1−
ηβ (1 + rT,t+1)
1 + β(1 + η)
(
wt − τt
wt+1
+
1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(31)
with,
rT,t+1 ≡ (1− at)rb,t+1 + atrk,t+1 (32)
at ≡ λtst
st +
wt+1
1+rb,t+1
(33)
Note that at is the fraction of an individual’s total wealth (financial wealth plus human
wealth) invested in the risky asset. Hence, rT,t+1 is the effective return on the individual’s
total portfolio when human wealth (i.e., the discounted value of future labour income)
is also taken into account. In case of a positive equity shock, i.e., rT is high, agents will
retire earlier due to a positive wealth effect, and vice versa. With inflexible retirement,
9In principle, private savings may not be equal in the flexible and fixed retirement case. However, in
Appendix C we show that sFt = s
I
t .
10Bodie et al. (1992) show that this result also holds for more general utility functions.
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the optimal retirement decision equals (see again Appendix C.2):
zIt+1 = 1−
ηβ (1 + rb,t+1)
1 + β(1 + η)
(
wt − τt
wt+1
+
1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(34)
Note that the risk-free return rb,t+1 now enters the retirement function rather than the
stochastic return rT,t+1. Accordingly, it is possible to derive the following result:
Result 2. The expected retirement age in the flexible retirement case is lower than in the
inflexible case, i.e., Et z
F
t+1 < z
I
t+1.
Proof. Using the optimal solution for st (derived in Appendix C), it follows from equation
(29) that λtst > 0. Using equation (33), this implies that at > 0 and, hence, Et rT,t+1 >
rb,t+1.
In summary, when people can adjust their retirement decision, they will invest more
in the risky asset. Since the risky asset has a higher expected return, these people can
on average afford to retire earlier.
5 Quantitative results
This section explores the quantitative properties of the model and numerically calculates
the steady state and the reaction of the various variables to productivity and deprecia-
tion shocks. We first use the model to gain insight in the partial equilibrium effects of
retirement (in)flexibility. Then we turn to the general equilibrium effects and relate these
to the partial equilibrium results.
5.1 Parameterization
In order to quantify the interaction between portfolio choice and retirement, we first have
to parameterize the model. We normalize the average productivity parameter at A = 1.
The capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production function is taken to be α = 0.3, as in
Krueger and Kubler (2006) and Olovsson (2010). We set δ, the average depreciation rate,
to 0.75. Assuming that one model period lasts about 30 years, this corresponds with a
depreciation rate of 5 percent per year, like in Olovsson (2010). We choose as benchmark
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one half, i.e., θ = 2, and an intratemporal
substitution of ρ = 1. An intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one half lies well
within the range of available estimates (see e.g. Attanasio and Weber, 1995 or Blundell
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Table 4: Benchmark parameterization
Parameter β γ ρ θ α A δ b σA σδ
Values 0.65 0.5 1 2 0.3 1 0.75 0.015 0.31 1.31
et al., 1994) and is commonly used in the macro and public finance literature (it implies
a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2). We choose as time discount factor β = 0.65,
or a time discount rate of 1.4 percent per year, as in Krueger and Kubler (2006). The
leisure parameter is set at γ = 0.5 and the supply of government debt is set at b = 0.015,
a combination which provides plausible values for the retirement age and the risk-free
return on government bonds (see below).
Since productivity risk directly affects all factor prices in the economy (wages and
asset returns) and depreciation risk only influences capital returns, the two risk factors
certainly have a different effect on retirement and portfolio decisions. We will therefore
analyse the model for depreciation and productivity risk separately. In order to make
the results comparable, we calibrate the standard deviation of the exogenous shock (i.e.,
σA in case of productivity risk and σδ in case of depreciation risk) in such a way that
the annualized standard deviation of the return on capital is the same in both cases and
equal to 8.2 percent.11 This leads to σA = 0.31 and σδ = 1.31. All parameters used in
the benchmark model are summarized in Table 4.
5.2 Partial equilibrium
For flexible labour supply, the partial equilibrium solution is determined by equations
(18) and (19), equations (T2.1)-(T2.4) and equation (T2.7a). In case of fixed labour
supply, we have to solve for equations (18), (19), (20), (21), equations (T2.1)-(T2.4) and
equation (T2.7b).
By definition, in the partial equilibrium model factor prices are exogenous and only
influenced by the exogenous shock terms ωA,t and ωδ,t. The log-linearized equations for
wages and capital returns are thus:
wˆt = ωA,t (35)
rˆk,t =
rk + δ
rk
ωA,t − δ
rk
ωδ,t (36)
11Here we follow Campbell and Viceira (2005) who show that returns on stocks are significantly less
volatile when the investment horizon is long.
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Table 5: Steady state of partial equilibrium models
Depreciation risk Productivity risk
Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible
c1/y 37.43 37.30 38.31 38.27
c2/y 51.41 49.25 49.36 49.54
s/w 30.62 30.84 32.05 32.12
z 21.21 14.73 16.67 17.43
λ 84.16 106.72 85.50 75.52
Note: all figures are expressed in percentages.
The partial elasticities of the wage rate and the return on capital with respect to
productivity and depreciation shocks (i.e., piw,A, piw,δ, pirk,A and pirk,δ), as shown in equa-
tion (35) and (36), are the same as those derived for the general equilibrium model with
fixed retirement.12 This makes sense because with fixed labour supply both the capital
stock and labour supply are predetermined variables. Conditional on information at time
t, the only source of variation in future factor prices comes from the exogenous shocks.
Consequently, if the exogenous variables w, rk, rb, A and δ are set at the corresponding
general equilibrium values, the partial equilibrium model gives exactly the same results.
Table 5 compares the steady-state results for fixed and flexible labour supply. The
table distinguishes between depreciation and productivity risk. The capital return, the
return on bonds and the wage rate are exogenous and obtained from the general equi-
librium model with inflexible labour supply. Note that, in case of depreciation risk, our
model reproduces the traditional view that retirement flexibility increases risk exposure,
the first result analytically derived in the previous section. From equation (35) and (36)
we see that wages and capital returns are not correlated when depreciation risk is the
only source of uncertainty. A positive depreciation shock (i.e., a negative wealth shock)
causes marginal utility from working to increase and, hence, agents increase labour supply
(or postpone retirement). Consequently, income effects generate a negative correlation
between asset returns and labour income, enabling investors to take greater advantage of
the equity premium. The result of this investment strategy is that retirement flexibility
induces agents to retire earlier on average compared to retirement inflexibility, the second
result derived in Section 4. Given our parameterization, agents choose to retire after 66.4
years in case of inflexible retirement while they retire on average after 64.4 years in case
12See Appendix B.2.
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Figure 1: Reaction of equity share in case of flexible retirement relative to inflexible
retirement, when the standard deviations of exogenous shocks are varied
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of flexible retirement, a difference of 2 years.13
If productivity risk is the sole risk factor, however, the results will turn around. In
that case, retirement flexibility may instead be used to amplify the productivity shocks
absorbed into consumption, leading to less risk exposure and a higher retirement age
compared to fixed retirement. The reason is that productivity shocks do not only in-
duce an income effect in labour supply but also a substitution effect which works in the
opposite direction. This substitution effect exacerbates the positive correlation between
labour income and capital returns, making equity investment relative unattractive un-
der retirement flexibility. When productivity goes down, both the return on capital and
the wage rate decrease. When people can freely adjust retirement, they will respond to
this lower wage rate by reducing labour supply, which decreases labour income even fur-
ther. Hence, under retirement flexibility labour supply behaviour is subject to procyclical
pressure which reduces the risk bearing capacity of consumers. As a result, people are
forced to work longer on average. Given our parameterization, this additional work span
amounts almost 3 months.
Figure 1 shows the change of the relative equity share (i.e., the equity share in case of
flexible retirement divided by the equity share in case of inflexible retirement) for different
values for σA and σδ in a three-dimensional mesh. The two standard deviations are varied
between 0.1 at the lower end and 0.9 at the upper end. When the retirement decision is
flexible in the second period of life, agents invest relatively much in equity if depreciation
risk is high and productivity risk low and vice versa.
13We assume that each generation lasts 30 years. Lifetime consists of 30 years of childhood and
schooling that are not accounted for, 30 years of full activity and a last period of 30 years the first part
of which is devoted to working and lasts 30z years. The retirement age is thus 60 + 30z.
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5.3 General equilibrium
Now we turn to the general equilibrium solution. Table 6 shows the steady-state results in
case of general equilibrium and again distinguishes between depreciation and productivity
risk. The first column with numbers shows the results for the deterministic steady state,
i.e., when the conditional variances are zero.
Comparing the deterministic steady state with the stochastic steady states gives an
impression of the role of uncertainty in the model. Obviously, if there is no uncertainty,
the equity premium (i.e., rk−rb) is equal to zero since capital investments and government
bonds are perfect substitutes. In the stochastic steady state, the equity premia are
positive reflecting the higher riskiness of capital investments.14 Including the risk terms
in the optimality conditions introduces a precautionary motive for more savings and
later retirement. Note that the saving rate and labour supply are higher in the stochastic
steady state than in the deterministic steady state.
In general equilibrium, exactly the same risk features appear as in partial equilibrium
but they are now operating through price adjustments rather than quantity adjustments.
With exogenous factor prices, we saw that agents invest more in equity under flexible
labour supply than under fixed labour supply if depreciation risk is the dominant source
of uncertainty. When productivity risk is the dominant source, we found the opposite
result, namely that agents invest less in equity under retirement flexibility than under
retirement inflexibility. With endogenous factor prices and a fixed supply of government
bonds, though, different risk attitudes affect the price of risk taking, i.e., the equity
premium. If productivity risk is the sole risk factor, the equity premium is higher in case
of flexible retirement than in case of inflexible retirement. In our benchmark case, this
difference in equity premium amounts 5 basis points. The intuition for this lower risk
appetite under flexible retirement is the same as before: the substitution effect related to
labour market flexibility exacerbates the positive correlation between asset returns and
labour income which decreases the risk appetite. Hence, people are only willing to invest
in the domestic capital stock if they receive a higher expected compensation. If there
is only depreciation risk, however, the insurance mechanism related to the income effect
dominates, resulting in a lower equity premium under labour market flexibility. Note
that the difference in equity premium is 20 basis points.
Like in the partial equilibrium model, steady-state labour supply is lower with flexible
retirement than with inflexible retirement if there is only depreciation risk. In the former
14Note that the reported risk premia are on the low side, which is a manifestation of the equity premium
puzzle.
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Table 6: Steady state of general equilibrium models
No risk Depreciation risk Productivity risk
Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible
c1/y 38.32 37.43 38.41 38.31 38.17
c2/y 50.10 51.41 49.62 49.36 49.52
s/w 30.48 30.62 31.39 32.05 32.11
rk 2.62 2.73 2.52 2.43 2.44
rb 2.62 2.21 2.20 2.11 2.07
z 16.57 21.21 17.04 16.67 17.14
k/y 15.44 14.88 15.96 16.44 16.41
λ 84.34 84.16 85.01 85.50 85.52
Note: the return on capital and government debt are annualized figures. All
figures are expressed in percentages.
case, people on average choose to retire after 65.1 years while in the latter case they
retire after 66.4 years, a difference of about 15 months. When agents have no retirement
flexibility and only face depreciation risk, labour supply is an attractive way to finance
future consumption compared to private savings, because wages are not uncertain while
the proceeds of savings are uncertain. On the contrary, with retirement flexibility equity
savings are attractive because people will probably earn the equity premium while they
always have the option to postpone retirement if things go wrong. Hence, compared to
the inflexible setting, agents save more and a higher fraction of these savings is allocated
to firm equity. Since the supply of government debt is given in general equilibrium, the
equity premium has to decline to make sure that enough savings are allocated to this
debt. It turns out that the wealth effect (more savings) dominates the price effect (lower
equity premium), resulting in lower labour supply under retirement flexibility.
If there is only productivity risk, instead, retirement flexibility is less interesting from
an insurance perspective because capital returns are low in states in which wages are also
low. Therefore, agents have a relative high demand for risk-free bonds which drives down
the interest rate on government debt. This negative wealth effect implies that agents on
average retire about 2 months later with flexible labour supply.
Figure 2 shows the dependence of portfolio and retirement decisions on the two risk
factors in a more general way. These figures compare the equity premium (left panel) and
labour supply (right panel) in case of retirement flexibility with those in case of retirement
inflexibility. If depreciation risk is high and productivity risk low, the risk premium is
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Figure 2: Reaction of equity premium and labour supply in case of flexible retirement
relative to inflexible retirement, when the standard deviations of exogenous shocks are
varied
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(a) Equity premium
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(b) Labour supply
lower under flexible retirement, reflecting the self-insurance role of voluntary retirement.
When productivity risk becomes more important, the equity premium increases and ul-
timately passes the levels of the fixed retirement setting. A comparable pattern emerges
for labour supply behaviour. For higher degrees of productivity risk, the hedging effect of
retirement flexibility decreases which leads to a higher demand for risk-free government
bonds and, given the fixed level of government debt, to lower risk-free interest rates. This
negative wealth effect induces agents to postpone retirement.
It should be stressed that from a welfare perspective flexibility is always preferable
to inflexibility. With retirement flexibility, expected lifetime utility is unambiguously
higher, both in case of depreciation risk and productivity risk.15 This result makes sense
because the model does not include any distortion or externality.
5.4 Dynamics
The different roles in the interaction between retirement flexibility and portfolio allocation
played by productivity and depreciation shocks can best be illustrated using impulse
response functions. Figure 3 shows the response of the capital stock, the return on
capital and bonds, the wage rate, labour supply and old-age consumption to a 10 percent
positive depreciation shock. These responses are expressed in percent deviation from the
15By simulating the derived recursive laws, we have calculated the unconditional means of most im-
portant model variables. It turns out that the unconditional mean of lifetime utility in case of flexible
retirement is always higher than that in case of inflexible retirement.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive 10 percent depreciation shock, given the bench-
mark parameterization
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative 10 percent productivity shock, given the bench-
mark parameterization
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steady state. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses for a negative productivity shock of
10 percent.
Note first that depreciation shocks lead to relative small responses compared to pro-
ductivity shocks. After a depreciation shock of 10 percent, the capital return immediately
decreases and, due to the income effect, labour supply increases. This negative correlation
between the capital return and labour supply moderates consumption volatility and that
is why flexibility provides insurance against adverse shocks. At impact, the decline of
old-age consumption is small compared to the decline of the capital return. The capital
stock is a predetermined variable and falls one period later. This lower level of the capital
stock increases its marginal product so that labour supply declines and, hence, wages and
consumption gradually return to their pre-shock levels. The return on bonds moves in
the opposite direction of the capital stock: a lower capital stock increases its marginal
product leading to a higher demand for capital investment and a lower demand for bond
investments. As a result, the return on bonds should increase in order to ensure that the
fixed supply of government debt will be financed each period.
The economic responses after a productivity shock are much larger. In this case,
the decrease in the capital return is even larger than the initial decline in productivity
itself. Compared to a depreciation shock, a productivity shock does not only directly
affect the return on capital but also the wage rate which falls at impact. This shock
induces income and substitution effects in labour supply. Indeed, given the benchmark
parameterization, the substitution effect dominates the income effect and that is why
labour supply slightly decreases. Hence, productivity shocks result in pro-cyclical labour
supply behaviour which exacerbates consumption volatility. Note that the initial decline
in old-age consumption is almost as high as the relative decrease in productivity. From an
investment point of view, the positive co-movement between capital returns and labour
income reduces the appetite for risk taking. Consequently, the equity premium will be
relatively higher under retirement flexibility.
5.5 Substitution between consumption and leisure
The previous analysis has shown that the insurance effect of retirement flexibility very
much depends on income and substitution effects in labour supply. In our benchmark
parameterization, the substitution effect slightly dominates the income effect so that
old-age consumption becomes more sensitive to productivity risk in case of retirement
flexibility. As a result, agents ask for a higher risk compensation (in general equilibrium)
or decrease the equity share in the total asset portfolio (in partial equilibrium).
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Figure 5: Impulse responses for a negative 10 percent productivity shock, for ρ = 0.8
(dotted line), ρ = 1 (solid line) and ρ = 2 (dashed line)
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The relative strength of income and substitution effects is governed by the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and leisure (i.e., 1/ρ). Figure 5 shows the responses
of labour supply and consumption to a negative productivity shock of (again) 10 percent
for various degrees of substitutability between consumption and leisure. The dotted line
is based on an elasticity of substitution of 1.25, the solid line repeats the benchmark case
of a unit elasticity and the dashed line is based on an elasticity of substitution of 0.5.
Indeed, for a higher (lower) elasticity, the substitution effect becomes relatively more
(less) important. In case the elasticity of substitution is 1.25, labour supply actually
decreases by more than 15 percent after a drop in productivity of 10 percent. If this
elasticity is 0.5, instead, labour supply increases by 3 percent. As one can see, these
labour supply responses make old-age consumption more pro-cyclical if the elasticity of
substitution is high and vice versa.
When retirement is flexible, the positive comovement of consumption and labour leads
to higher equity premia if the elasticity of substitution increases. Figure 6 (left panel)
shows the reaction of the equity premium in case of retirement flexibility relative to
the equity premium in case of inflexibility for different degrees of substitution between
consumption and leisure.16 For low values of ρ (high elasticity of substitution), the
equity premium under flexible retirement exceeds the equity premium under inflexible
retirement. For higher values of ρ (lower elasticity of substitution), the income effect
becomes gradually more important and, hence, also the insurance effect of retirement
16In Figure 6, it is assumed that productivity risk is the sole risk factor, because substitution effects
in labour supply are not relevant in case of depreciation risk.
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Figure 6: Reaction of equity portfolio investment in case of flexible retirement relative
to inflexible retirement, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (left panel) and
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (right panel) are varied
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(b) Risk aversion
flexibility increases. So when the elasticity of substitution is high, retirement flexibility
acts in the direction of resolving the equity risk premium puzzle (Basak, 1999).
The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates the sensitivity of the relative equity premium,
now for different degrees of risk aversion (or intertemporal substitution). As one can
see, for all values of θ considered, the ratio is decreasing in relative risk aversion but
it never falls below unity. This means that, contrary to the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution, the coefficient of relative risk aversion does not alter the order of the equity
premium: for all values considered, the equity premium is higher with flexible retirement
than with fixed retirement.
5.6 Importance of general equilibrium effects
An interesting question is whether the general equilibrium effects increase or decrease
the risk appetite compared to a partial equilibrium approach.17 As mentioned in the
Introduction, existing studies only focus on partial equilibrium models thereby ignoring
the potentially important general equilibrium effects. Our model can be used to isolate
the general equilibrium effects of retirement flexibility and to identify the main factors
that determine the direction of these effects. As will be discussed, the differences between
general equilibrium and partial equilibrium results can be reduced to differences in the
17Remember that under fixed retirement the partial equilibrium solution coincides with the general
equilibrium solution. Hence, in this section, the comparison between partial and general equilibrium
only points to flexible retirement.
29
partial elasticities of the capital return and labour supply with respect to the exogenous
shocks (i.e., pirk,A, piz,A, pirk,δ and piz,δ). Recall from equations (25) and (26) that these
elasticities determine the conditional variances σ2rk−v and σ
2
v under flexible retirement.
Figure 7 shows the portfolio share of equity in general equilibrium compared to the
equity share in partial equilibrium, again plotted for various degrees of productivity and
depreciation risk. In order to make a comparison possible, for each combination of pro-
ductivity and depreciation risk, the exogenous factor prices in partial equilibrium are
imposed to be the same as the calculated factor prices in general equilibrium. Let us
first focus on the upper panel which is based on log-linear lifetime utility (θ = 1 and
ρ = 1). For all standard deviations considered, the relative equity exposure is below
unity meaning that in general equilibrium agents invest less in equity than in partial
equilibrium. Note that this difference in risk exposure is particularly large if depreciation
risk is high. Since everyone decides to work longer (or to postpone retirement) after an
adverse depreciation shock, wages will decline in general equilibrium. Consequently, the
positive elasticity of labour supply with respect to depreciation shocks (piz,δ) is lower in
general equilibrium which makes the insurance effect of retirement flexibility less effec-
tive. Optimizing agents respond to this by lowering their risk exposure. At the same
time, the higher supply of labour will also moderate the decline of the capital return in
general equilibrium. In other words, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to
depreciation shocks (pirk,δ) is less negative than in partial equilibrium. This improves the
effectiveness of the insurance effect and, hence, tends to boost risky investments. With
this parameterization, though, the negative effect on risky investments (due to a lower
piz,δ) dominates the positive effect (due to a less negative pirk,δ).
Why is the relative equity share still below unity for higher degrees of productivity
risk? As seen before, with an elasticity of substitution equal to one, agents choose to
advance retirement after a negative productivity shock (see panel (e) of Figure 4). In
other words, the substitution effect dominates the income effect in labour supply (i.e.,
piz,A > 0). In general equilibrium, this reduction in labour supply exacerbates the direct
fall of the capital return on account of the productivity contraction. Hence, the capital
return is more sensitive to productivity risk than in partial equilibrium (i.e., pirk,A higher)
which decreases the effectiveness of the hedging effect of retirement flexibility.
If we increase risk aversion in the second panel of Figure 7, the insurance effect is
still less effective in general equilibrium for higher levels of productivity risk. However,
it becomes more effective for lower degrees of productivity risk and higher degrees of
depreciation risk. If risk aversion is higher, the relatively low sensitivity of the capital
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Figure 7: Reaction of equity share in case of general equilibrium relative to partial equi-
librium, when the standard deviations of exogenous shocks are varied
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(a) θ = 1 and ρ = 1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
Stdev AStdev delta
la
m
bd
a
G
E  
/ l
am
bd
a
PE
(b) θ = 2 and ρ = 1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Stdev AStdev delta
la
m
bd
a
G
E  
/ l
am
bd
a
PE
(c) θ = 2 and ρ = 2
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return with respect to depreciation risk in general equilibrium (which improves the ef-
fectiveness of the insurance effect) now dominates the relatively low response in labour
supply (which worsens the effectiveness).
In the previous section, we have seen that the elasticity of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure plays a crucial role in whether retirement flexibility increases or
decreases the equity premium (or the equity share in partial equilibrium) compared to
retirement inflexibility. From the lowest panel of Figure 7, it can be seen that this param-
eter is also decisive in the direction of the general equilibrium effects. This panel is based
on an elasticity of substitution of one half, implying that income effects now dominate
substitution effects (i.e., piz,A < 0). That means, a negative productivity shock induces
people to retire later in time. In general equilibrium, this retirement shift moderates the
direct drop in the capital return due to the negative productivity shock. In other words,
when income effects are dominating, the sensitivity of the capital return to productivity
risk (pirk,A) is lower in general equilibrium than in partial equilibrium. Because this lower
sensitivity increases the insurance effect of retirement flexibility, the relative equity share
is now increasing in the degree of productivity risk.
To summarize, the equity exposure can either be higher or lower in general equilibrium
compared to partial equilibrium. This holds true both for productivity and depreciation
risk. In case of depreciation risk, the labour supply elasticity with respect to depreciation
shocks is lower in general equilibrium (which depresses equity investments) but, at the
same time, the capital return is less sensitive to these shocks (which stimulates equity
investments). We have shown that for low (high) levels of risk aversion the first (second)
effect is dominating. In case of productivity risk, the elasticity of intratemporal sub-
stitution determines whether agents invest more or less in equity in general equilibrium
compared to partial equilibrium. For high intratemporal substitution (i.e., the substi-
tution effect dominates), the capital return is relatively more sensitive to productivity
shocks in general equilibrium resulting in lower equity exposures. For low substitution
(i.e., the income effect dominates), the opposite holds, meaning that agents invest rela-
tively more in equity in general equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a stochastic general equilibrium model with two over-
lapping generations. The model is used to analyse the interaction between consumption,
portfolio choice and retirement decisions. In the literature, retirement flexibility is often
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viewed as a kind of insurance against bad investment outcomes. This paper reviews this
benchmark result in a more general model. In particular, in our model the risk factors
(productivity risk and depreciation risk) are directly linked to the production structure
of the economy. Second, and more importantly, we use a general equilibrium approach
rather than a partial equilibrium approach thereby explicitly recognizing that correlations
between productivity and depreciation shocks are (at least partly) endogenous. Finally,
we allow for more general preferences which are characterized by a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function of consumption and leisure.
Our main findings are as follows. First, the relevance of retirement flexibility as a
hedging instrument strongly depends on the type of risk agents are subject to. Pro-
ductivity risk affects wages and asset returns in the same direction. Under retirement
flexibility, this positive correlation between wages and asset returns is reinforced by the
substitution effect on labour supply resulting in a lower preference for risk taking. In par-
tial equilibrium this lower demand leads to lower equity shares in the total investment
portfolio while in general equilibrium it leads to higher equity premia as the supply of
assets is (partly) fixed. With depreciation risk, though, wages are only indirectly affected
by general equilibrium effects. In this case, the income effect dominates implying that
labour income and capital returns are negatively correlated which increases the prefer-
ence for risk taking. In partial equilibrium, this higher demand leads to higher portfolio
shares invested in equity, in general equilibrium it leads to lower equity premia.
Second, our analysis reveals that the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure is of crucial importance in determining to which extent retirement flexibility
protects retirees against adverse bad investment returns. Indeed, this elasticity governs
the relative strength of income and substitution effects in labour supply and therefore
determines the hedging effect of retirement flexibility. Our analysis clearly shows that the
advantage of flexible retirement as a hedging instrument is smaller if substitution effects
are relatively important. Empirical studies indeed suggest that substitution effects are
more important for the retirement decision than income or wealth effects.
Finally, we find that general equilibrium effects play an important role in the interac-
tion between portfolio choice and retirement. Ignoring these effects by sticking to a partial
equilibrium framework can either overstate or understate the insurance benefits of retire-
ment flexibility. It is mainly the degree of substitution between consumption and leisure
that determines the direction of the general equilibrium effects. For high substitution
elasticities, which seems empirically the most relevant case, labour supply behaviour am-
plifies the sensitivity of capital returns to productivity risk making retirement flexibility
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less effective as hedging tool in general equilibrium than in partial equilibrium.
Our paper can benefit from a number of relevant extensions. First, the menu of
shocks could be extended to include, for example, demographic shocks (such as shocks to
longevity or fertility) and inflation shocks (see e.g., Adema, 2008). As a second extension,
we can include social security along with individual heterogeneity. Retirement flexibility
and social security have in common that they both can protect retirees against adverse
shocks. In this paper, we have deliberately focused on a simple setting without social
security thereby ignoring the interaction between retirement flexibility and social security.
In future work, we want to introduce social security along with individual heterogeneity to
tackle similar issues as studied in this paper. We will in particular focus on how portfolio
and retirement decisions, made by heterogeneous agents, are affected by uniform social
security systems.
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A The steady state
A.1 Derivation first-order conditions
We can write equation (T1.3) as,
1 = Et [exp {log β + log (1 + rk,t+1) + θ log c1,t − ρ log c2,t+1 + (ρ− φ) log vt+1}]
≡ Et [exp {xt+1}] (A.1)
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of exp{xt+1} around Et xt+1 ≡ x¯t, we can write,
1 ≈ Et
[
exp {x¯t}
(
1 + xt+1 − x¯t + 1
2
(xt+1 − x¯t)2
)]
= exp {x¯t}
(
1 +
1
2
Vartxt+1
)
(A.2)
Then, a first-order Taylor expansion around zero gives the result,
1 ≈ 1 + x¯t + 1
2
Vartxt+1 ⇒
1 ≈ exp
{
x¯t +
1
2
Vartxt+1
}
(A.3)
Note that we can write equation (7) as,
log v =
log [exp {log(1− γ) + (1− ρ) log c1}+ exp {log γ + (1− ρ) log(1− z)}]
(1− ρ)(1− γ) (A.4)
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion around zero then gives:
log v ≈ log c1 + η log(1− z) (A.5)
with η ≡ γ/(1 − γ). Combining equations (A.3) and (A.5), we obtain the steady-state
Euler equation regarding capital investments, equation (T2.3):
c−θ1 = β (1 + rk) c
−φ
2 (1− z)η(ρ−φ) exp
(
1
2
σ2rk−v
)
(A.6)
with σ2rk−v defined in equation (18).
The derivation of the second Euler equation, equation (T2.4), and of the optimality
condition with respect to fixed retirement, equation (T2.7b), are similar to the one above.
38
A.2 Deterministic steady state
Suppose that θ = ρ→ 1 and δ = 1. Ignoring the risk terms or assuming a non-stochastic
steady state implies that rk = rb ≡ r. Then inserting equation (T2.1) and equation
(T2.2) in the Euler equation (T2.3) (or equation (T2.4)) gives:
1 + β
β
k = w − rb− 1 + β
β
b− w
(1 + r)β
z (A.7)
From the optimality condition with respect to leisure, equation (T2.7a) (or equation
(T2.7b)), we derive:
k =
w
(1 + r)η
(1− z)− w
1 + r
z − b (A.8)
Substituting equation (A.8) in (A.7) and solving for z gives:
z =
1 + β − βη(1 + r) (1− rb
w
)
1 + β + βη
(A.9)
Inserting equation (A.8) in equation (A.7) and solving for k leads to:
k =
β(1 + η)w
(
1− rb
w
)− w
1+r
− (1 + β + βη)b
1 + β + βη
(A.10)
Using the factor prices, equation (T2.5) and equation (T2.6), we can rewrite equation
(A.10) into:
1 + z =
β(1 + η)
(
1− rb
w
)
(1− α) ( k
1+z
)α−1 − 1−α
α
(1 + β + βη)
(
1 + b
k
) (A.11)
In the same way, we can rewrite (A.9) into:
1 + z =
2(1 + β) + βη − βη (1− rb
w
)
αA
(
k
1+z
)α−1
1 + β + βη
(A.12)
Equations (A.11) and (A.12) form a closed system in k and z. Solving these equations
gives for the capital-labour ratio,
k
1 + z
=
[ (
1− α + η + ηα b
k
)
αβ
(
1− rb
w
)
1− α + (1 + b
k
)
α(2 + 2β + βη)
] 1
1−α
(A.13)
and for labour supply:
z =
1− α− αη − αη b
k
1 + η − α + αη b
k
(A.14)
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Using the definition λ ≡ k/(b+k) in equation (A.14), gives the labour supply decision as
function of the portfolio choice (equation (22)). Notice that equation (A.13) still depends
on w and r, which are functions of the capital-labour ratio. Again using equations (T2.5)
and (T2.6), we derive:
rb
w
=
αA
(
k
1+z
)α−1 − 1
(1− α) ( k
1+z
)α−1 bk (1 + z) (A.15)
Finally, substituting this expression in equation (A.13) and using equation (A.14), we
obtain:
k
1 + z
=
[
αβA(1 + η − α− 2α b
k
)
1 + α + αβ(2 + η) + 2α b
k
] 1
1−α
(A.16)
Using the definition λ in equation (A.16), gives the capital-labour ratio as function of the
portfolio choice (equation (23)).
B The partial elasticities
We are looking for the following dynamic system:
kˆt+1 = pik,kkˆt + pik,AωA,t + pik,δωδ,t (A.17)
and: 
cˆ1,t
cˆ2,t
rˆk,t
wˆt
rˆb,t+1
zˆt or zˆt+1

=

pic1,k
pic2,k
pirk,k
piw,k
pirb,k
piz,k

kˆt +

pic1,A pic1,δ
pic2,A pic2,δ
pirk,A pirk,δ
piw,A piw,δ
pirb,A pirb,δ
piz,A piz,δ

[
ωA,t
ωδ,t
]
(A.18)
where pix,y denotes the partial elasticity of endogenous variable x with respect to state
variable y. With retirement flexibility, the recursive law for labour supply is based on zˆt.
With retirement inflexibility, it is based on zˆt+1 because retirement is predetermined at
time t.
B.1 Flexible retirement
Note that equations (T3.2), (T3.5), (T3.6) and (T3.7a) form an independent system of
the endogenous variables cˆ2,t, wˆt, rˆk,t and zˆt in the predetermined variables kˆt and rˆb,t and
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the exogenous shocks ωA,t and ωδ,t. From this system we can infer the partial elasticities
with respect to productivity shocks and depreciation shocks:
pic2,A =
(1− z + ρz + αρ) y
c2∆
> 0
pirk,A =
(rk + δ) (ρ+ ρz + ρΓ + 1− z)
rk∆
> 0
piw,A =
ρ (1 + z) (1 + Γ− α)
(1− α)∆ > 0
piz,A =
(1 + z) [(1− z)(1− α)− ρΓ (α + z)]
z(1− α)∆
pic2,δ = −
δk (ρ+ α− αz + ρz)
c2∆
< 0
pirk,δ = −
δ [ρ(1 + z) + (1− z)α + ρΓ (1 + z − αz)]
rk∆
< 0
piw,δ = −ρ(1− z)δkα
c2∆
< 0
piz,δ =
(1 + z)(1− z)ρδk
c2z∆
> 0
To save on notation, Γ and ∆ are defined as:
Γ ≡ w1− 1ρη 1ρ
∆ ≡ (1− z)α + (1 + z)ρ(1 + Γ) + ραΓ
Note that the sign of piz,A is ambiguous; it can either be positive or negative, depending
on the substitution between consumption and leisure.
Noting that Et ωA,t+1 = Et ωδ,t+1 = 0 and using the Euler equations (T3.3) and
(T3.4), we now can express the bond return rˆb,t+1, the conditional expectations Et cˆ2,t+1
and Et cˆrk,t+1 together with first-period consumption cˆ1,t as functions of the next-period
capital stock kˆt+1:
Φrb ≡
rˆb,t+1
kˆt+1
= −(1 + rb) ρ(1 + z)y [(rk + δ) (1 + Γ− α) + (1− δ)αΓ]
(1 + rk) rby∆ + (1 + rb) rbρ (rk + δ) Γ (1 + z) b
(A.19)
Φc2 ≡
Et cˆ2,t+1
kˆt+1
=
[ρ+ α + z(ρ− α)] [(1− δ)k + rbbΦrb ]
c2∆
+
α [1− z + ρ(z + α)] y
c2∆
(A.20)
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Φz ≡ Et zˆt+1
kˆt+1
=
(1− z) (1 + z) [αc2 − αρ(y − w)− ρ(1− δ)k − ρrbbΦrb ]
c2z∆
(A.21)
Φc1 ≡
cˆ1,t
kˆt+1
=
1
θ
[
φΦc2 −
rbΦrb
1 + rb
+
η(ρ− φ)zΦz
1− z
]
(A.22)
Notice from equation (A.19) that rˆb,t and kˆt - the two predetermined variables - move
proportionally. Therefore, using this equation, we can substitute out rˆb,t from the state
space.
Substituting equation (A.22) in the budget restriction, equation (T3.1), we ultimately
obtain the solution to equation (A.17), with:
pik,k =
wpiw,k − rbbΦrb
c1Φc1 + k
pik,A =
wpiw,A
c1Φc1 + k
pik,δ =
wpiw,δ
c1Φc1 + k
The system is stable if and only if pik,k < 1. This solution for the endogenous state
variable pins down the solutions of the other endogenous variables in equation (A.18).
The partial elasticities with respect to the capital stock are equal to:
pic1,k = Φc1pik,k
pic2,k = Φc2
pirk,k =
rk + δ
rk
[
α (ρ+ ρz + ρΓ + 1− z)
∆
− Γρ (1 + z) (k − δk + rbbΦrb)
y∆
− 1
]
piw,k =
αρ (1 + z) (1 + Γ− α)
(1− α)∆ +
αρ (1− z) (k − δk + rbbΦrb)
c2∆
pirb,k = Φrbpik,k
piz,k = Φz
The remaining elasticities with respect to productivity and depreciation shocks are:
pic1,A = Φc1pik,A
pirb,A = Φrbpik,A
pic1,δ = Φc1pik,δ
pirb,δ = Φrbpik,δ
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B.2 Fixed retirement
In case of fixed retirement, equations (T3.2), (T3.5) and (T3.6) form an independent
system of the endogenous variables cˆ2,t, wˆt and rˆk,t in terms of the three predetermined
variables kˆt, rˆb,t and zˆt and the two exogenous shocks ωA,t and ωδ,t. From this system we
can derive the following elasticities with respect to productivity:
pic2,A =
y − w
c2
> 0
pirk,A =
rk + δ
rk
> 0
piw,A = 1
pic2,δ = −
δk
c2
< 0
pirk,δ = −
δ
rk
< 0
piw,δ = 0
with Γ now defined as:
Γ ≡ w1− 1ρη 1ρ exp
[
1
2ρ
(
σ2c2 − σ2w−c2
)]
With inflexible retirement, equation (A.19)-(A.22) are still valid but Φz is now defined as
Φz ≡ zˆt/kˆt. Consequently, also the partial elasticities with respect to the capital stock still
hold except that piz,k = Φzpik,k. The remaining elasticities with respect to productivity
shocks are:
pik,A =
w
c1Φc1 + k
pic1,A = Φc1pik,A
pirb,A = Φrbpik,A
piz,A = Φzpik,A
With fixed retirement, the capital stock, first-period consumption, the bond return and
labour supply do not respond to depreciation shocks. That is,
pik,δ = pic1,δ = pirb,δ = piz,δ = 0
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C Portfolio choice in partial equilibrium
Suppose that we have log-linear lifetime utility in consumption and leisure (i.e., ρ = θ =
1). Assume further that wages are non-stochastic.
C.1 Flexible retirement
Portfolio choice. Inserting equation (12) in equation (10), and using equation (8), we
obtain:
c2,t+1 =
1
1 + η
(1 + rT,t+1)
(
st +
wt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(A.23)
where rT,t+1 is defined in equation (32). Note that c2,t+1 is decomposed in non-stochastic
terms (the first and third term) and a stochastic term (the second one). Substituting
(A.23) in the two Euler equations (for j = rb and j = rk) and subtracting both, we have:
Et
[
(1 + rT,t+1)
−1 (rk,t+1 − rb,t+1)
]
= 0 (A.24)
Taking logs of equation (A.24), we obtain:
Et r˜k,t+1 +
1
2
Vartr˜k,t+1 − r˜b,t+1 = Covt (r˜T,t+1, r˜k,t+1) (A.25)
with r˜i ≡ log (1 + ri) and i = k, T and where we used the Jensen’s inequality condition
for a lognormal variable, i.e., log Et xt+1 = Et log xt+1 + 1/2Vart log xt+1. To derive the
term on the left-hand side of equation (A.25), we follow Campbell and Viceira (2002)
and use a second-order Taylor approximation of the portfolio return, equation (32). This
gives,
r˜T,t+1 ≈ r˜b,t+1 + at (r˜k,t+1 − r˜b,t+1) + 1
2
at(1− at)Vartr˜k,t+1 (A.26)
Hence,
Covt (r˜T,t+1, r˜k,t+1) = atVartr˜k,t+1 (A.27)
Substituting equation (A.27) into (A.25) then gives:
at =
Et r˜k,t+1 − r˜b,t+1 + 12Vartr˜k,t+1
Vartr˜k,t+1
(A.28)
Finally, inserting (A.28) in (33), we end up with the portfolio allocation in terms of fi-
nancial wealth (see equation (29)).
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Consumption and leisure. Substituting equation (A.23) in equation (11) (for j = rb)
and rearranging gives:
c−11,t = β(1 + η) (1 + rb,t+1) Et (1 + rT,t+1)
−1
(
wt − τt − c1,t + wt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)−1
(A.29)
Notice that:
(1 + rb,t+1) Et (1 + rT,t+1)
−1 = (1 + rb,t+1) Et (1 + rT,t+1)
−1
+at Et
[
(1 + rT,t+1)
−1 (rk,t+1 − rb,t+1)
]
= 1 (A.30)
Hence, first-period consumption satisfies:
c1,t =
1
1 + β(1 + η)
(
wt − τt + wt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(A.31)
Note that the propensity to consume is the same as under certainty. Hence, there is
no precautionary saving motive, which is a direct implication of the log-utility specifi-
cation (see Sandmo, 1970). Combining (A.31) and (A.23), we obtain for second-period
consumption:
c2,t+1 =
β (1 + rT,t+1)
1 + β(1 + η)
(
wt − τt + wt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(A.32)
Substituting (A.32) in (12), we obtain the expression for labour supply (see equation (31)).
C.2 Inflexible retirement
Portfolio choice. Consider now the fixed retirement setting. Then the intertemporal
budget constraint becomes:
c2,t+1 = (1 + rT,t+1)
(
st +
wt+1zt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)
(A.33)
with rT,t+1 again defined as in (32) but where at now satisfies:
at =
λtst
st +
wt+1zt+1
1+rb,t+1
(A.34)
Inserting (A.33) in the two Euler equations (for j = rb and j = rk) again gives condition
(A.24). Hence, at is still given by equation (A.28). Inserting (A.28) into (33) we end up
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with the portfolio share in terms of financial wealth (see equation (30)).
Consumption and leisure. The fact that wages are nonstochastic implies that the
first-order condition with respect to leisure consumption, equation (13), becomes:
η
1− zt+1 = wt+1 Et c
−1
2,t+1 (A.35)
Combining (A.35) and (11) (for j = rb), gives:
(1− zt+1)wt+1 = ηβ (1 + rb,t+1) c1,t (A.36)
Substituting (A.33) in (11) (again for j = rb) and rearranging gives:
c−11,t = β
(
wt − τt − c1,t + wt+1zt+1
1 + rb,t+1
)−1
(A.37)
where we (again) used equality (A.30). Substitution of (A.36) in (A.37) gives:
c−11,t = β
[
wt − τt + wt+1
1 + rb,t+1
− (1 + ηβ)c1,t
]−1
(A.38)
Hence,
c1,t =
1
1 + β(1 + η)
(
wt − τt + wt+1
1 + τb,t+1
)
(A.39)
Note that consumption (and thus savings) under fixed labour supply is exactly equal to
consumption under flexible labour supply. Substituting (A.39) in (A.36) and solving for
zt+1, we ultimately obtain the optimal retirement decision (see equation (34)).
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